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Abstract 
 
 
The introduction of a common currency as well as the harmonization of rules and regulations 
in Europe has significantly reduced distance in all its guises. With shrunken costs of 
overcoming space, this emphasizes centripetal forces and it should foster consolidation of 
financial activity. In a national context, as a rule, comparable developments have led to the 
emergence of one financial center. Hence, Europeanization of financial and monetary affairs 
could foretell the relegation of some European financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris to 
third-rank status. Frankfurt’s financial history is interesting insofar as it has lost (in the 
1870s) and regained (mainly in the 1980s) its preeminent place in the German context. 
However, because Europe is still characterized by local pockets of information-sensitive 
assets as well as a demand for variety, the national analogy probably does not hold. There is 
room in Europe for a number of financial hubs of an international dimension, including 
Frankfurt. 
 I. In lieu of an introduction: A bit of history 
A generation ago, Charles Kindleberger was struck by the “curious fact that the 
formation of financial centers is no longer studied in economics”, and he surmised 
that the topic had fallen “between two stools”, becoming somehow location-less be-
tween urban economics and financial economics. Taking one’s clue in particular 
from finance, one could come away with the impression “that the money and capital 
market was spread evenly throughout a given country” (Kindleberger 1974, p. 1) – 
which it is most evidently not. By starting from first principles, one could easily add 
to the confusion, according to which “(a) market is infinitesimally close geographi-
cally, but infinitely remote personally” (Leamer 2007, p. 99). Leamer’s proposition 
should be particularly descriptive of financial markets, leading to a straightforward 
conclusion: Finance should simply have no spatial dimension, no natural place. 
With borders becoming ever less important, this should ultimately hold true for the 
world at large, at a minimum for the three time zones.
1 
This leaves us with a real aporia since financial activity is obviously neither a sin-
gle-point-of-delivery issue nor indiscriminately dispersed. While in Europe dis-
tances have been effectively reduced through the introduction of a common cur-
rency and political (Financial Services Action Plan) as well as technological inno-
vations, there are nevertheless still numerous and very much distinctive financial 
hubs. And one of those financial entrepôts is Frankfurt, being by a wide margin the 
leading financial center in Germany, one of the most important financial locations 
on the European continent, and also a financial hub of a certain international impor-
tance.  
Frankfurt’s financial history has been particularly interesting because it had not al-
ways been what it is now. For centuries, starting with the fairs of the late Middle 
Ages, Frankfurt had been a focal point for trade in staples and a place for exchang-
ing financial assets. However, after Germany’s unification in 1871, it lost its role as 
a leading financial place to Berlin, the capital of the newly established Empire. In-
terestingly, “the emergence of a single financial center … has taken place twice, on 
both occasions in connection with a war: first in the rise to dominance of Berlin 
                                                           
1 In a 7/7 world, even this would be open to doubt.  -2- 
over Cologne, Frankfurt, Darmstadt … and, second, in the gradual emergence of 
Frankfurt as the financial capital of West Germany…” (Kindleberger 1974, p. 24).
2 
Thus, Frankfurt only won back its former position in the late-1950s, and this was 
largely due to a historical twist of fate – if one would like to file political delibera-
tions under such a heading. At that time, the relevant competitors in the nationally 
defined sphere were Hamburg, with its dominating port facilities, and Düsseldorf, 
mainly serving Western Germany’s powerhouse, the Ruhr industrial district. For 
obvious political reasons, Berlin was not a candidate for this role.  
So, what is unique from today’s perspective is that Frankfurt has re-gained its pre-
sent position in Germany only relatively recently, joining a select group of global 
cities that have been financial centers for a significantly longer period of time. 
Therefore, in order to gauge whether Europe (or “Euroland” only) is possibly up for 
the emergence of a single financial center – a question already raised and answered 
in the affirmative by Charles Kindleberger in 1974 – Germany could be an interest-
ing case study.  
This paper is dedicated to the questions of what the current status of Frankfurt as a 
financial center is, on which strengths it rests and what its perspectives are to de-
fend its position. We start out in Section II by discussing the nature and the func-
tions of financial centers. Then, in Section III, we analyze financial center competi-
tion in general, briefly alluding to the recent redesign of the financial landscape in 
Europe in particular. Section IV is dedicated to the current place of Frankfurt within 
the system of national and international financial centers, and Section V concludes 
with a view on what the perspectives of Frankfurt as a financial hub may be.  
                                                           
2 Darmstadt, 30 km south of Frankfurt, became an attractive financial location for private bankers 
since it was just beyond the restrictive reach of Prussian financial market regulations (see Adolf 
Weber 1902).  -3- 
II. Functions of financial centers 
Financial centers are locations with a considerable concentration of financial activ-
ity, of institutions specialized in performing these activities, and of people that work 
in these institutions. How much financial activity can be concentrated and how im-
portant such concentration can be becomes obvious once one thinks of the City of 
London, New York’s financial district – or downtown Frankfurt for that matter.  
Such concentration is not unfamiliar. In fact, within the reach of their relevant mar-
kets, industries are frequently locally highly concentrated. This is a fact of which 
urban economics never tires of reminding us (see for example McDonald 1997). 
The underlying rational of these clusters are the advantages of different activities 
being conducted within proximity. Bunching together lines of business produces 
mutually reinforcing effects. Such economies of localization have already been ob-
served and convincingly analyzed by Alfred Marshall: “When an industry has thus 
chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the advantages 
which people following the same skilled trade get from near neighborhood to one 
another” (Marshall 1920, p. 225). 
Positive spillovers from “near-neighborhood” effects – what we today call agglom-
eration economies – are therefore of the essence in the formation of local clusters. 
They foster information exchange. They allow for competition. And they are con-
ducive to innovation. Near-neighborhood effects stand in particular for economies 
external to a particular firm. They are arising from and dependent on the size of a 
local industry. Especially pertinent are inter-industry linkages. They allow for shar-
ing specialized labor and intermediate inputs while at the same time attracting the 
suppliers of those specialized capabilities. And they are, as Michael Piore and 
Charles Sabel (1984) have shown with the help of impressive case studies, the deci-
sive factors to understand the competitiveness of regions.  
Following Michael Porter (1990), those agglomerative externalities produce home 
bases thriving on (as well as being defined by) the availability of input factors as 
well as, in the output dimension, the access to clients, in particular the regional dis-
persion of customers. All of this produces a comparative advantage for firms be--4- 
longing to such a cluster (Krugman 1991): these firms can rely on a pool of special-
ized labor, they have access to high-quality intermediate inputs and, most impor-
tantly, they do profit from knowledge spillovers – the capacity to transmit and proc-
ess information effectively. The latter point appears to be specifically pertinent for 
knowledge industries, to which the financial sector obviously belongs. Agglomera-
tion fosters the creation, mobility and applicability of ideas. This is the “mysteries 
in the air”-argument of Marshall who wrote: “…the mysteries of trade…. are as it 
were in the air”. The distinction between input- vs. markets- or client-oriented ac-
tivities adds a further instructive dimension to localization: With costs of communi-
cation decreasing, the availability and quality of inputs becomes more important in 
location decisions. And localization economies, being external to firms, eventually 
generate clusters. 
These “Marshallian externalities” translate into economies of scale and scope. They 
are the upshot of an interaction of increasing returns (fixed costs spread over a lar-
ger production base), a reduction of the costs of transportation or communication 
(of overcoming distance in its various guises), and a sophisticated as well as chal-
lenging demand. All of this ultimately leads to geographical concentration deriving 
its overall advantage on the back of critical-mass effects (Krugman 1991, p. 15, 28). 
When users’ benefits are increasing with the number of other users, as is for exam-
ple obviously the case with the liquidity provided by exchange platforms (the so-
called order-flow externality), then network effects, positive feedback, reinforce 
possible centripetal tendencies.  
As concerns the geography of financial places, there is an inherent arbitrariness in 
their location. Natural endowments, while having been of some relevance in former 
times, have nonetheless never been decisive. The medieval fairs, for example, were 
located at geographically favorable places. But they mainly owed their attractive-
ness, in a very literal sense of the word, to being regulated more lightly (Braudel 
1979, pp. 79-96). In other words, political decisions always clinched the case. 
Moreover, localization has been frequently the consequence of historical accidents 
of sorts.  Frankfurt, as already mentioned, regained its former prominence as a re-
sult of a redesigning of the German financial landscape after WWII. This was “fi-
nancial statecraft” as understood by Benn Steil and Robert Litan (2006), namely a -5- 
restructuring of the German economy along the federalist lines of the U.S. Keeping 
the financial capital separated from the political one meant that Frankfurt, not least 
because of the location of the German central bank, the Bundesbank and its prede-
cessor institution, had for sure a certain advantage (in particular in the money mar-
kets). Nonetheless, ever since the 1980s, Frankfurt’s dynamic relative to its German 
competitors was largely driven by its attractiveness – from a client perspective – in 
terms of costs and innovativeness.  
Therefore, though not always avowed openly, politics is part and parcel of the com-
petitive positioning of financial places (see for a more general view on the state’s 
un-acknowledged role Pastré 2006, see as well Tyson 1994). The “Corporation of 
London” probably qualifies for the very “happy protectionists” which Olivier Pastré 
describes so convincingly (ibid., p. 77). Rules and regulations, the provision of a re-
liable infrastructure, the availability of a competent pool of human resources did 
and do make a critical difference. And the public sector, obviously, plays a defining 
role in this. The institutional environment, as delivered by the political system, 
hence can be conducive as well hindering to the development of financial places.  
Financial centers are, obviously, host to multiple lines of business activities – rang-
ing from bank intermediation to trading in all sorts of instruments, including the 
supporting infrastructures. Their distinctiveness arises from the gestalt they give to 
these pursuits. Most fundamentally, financial centers are communication hubs, pro-
viding for the cost efficient processing of information. Stock exchanges historically 
developed literally as places of exchange, as devices to reduce costs of transacting 
(see in particular Braudel 1979 or Weber 1999/1896). And with advances in com-
munication technologies the average costs of conceiving and operating systems has 
been ever more declining. This entails spreading fixed costs, it fosters centripetal 
forces and it explains much of the market consolidation going on (Harris, 2003, p. 
159). With information processing becoming cheaper, the flow of information is in-
creasing, which allows for more trading activity to take place (Kotz 2004). Tech-
nology therefore has a strong cost- and thus distance-reducing effect. Moreover, 
technological advances do impact on the complete value chain, they enhance the ef-
ficiency of clearing and settlement systems as well as those of all ancillary services. -6- 
With the ratio of variable to fixed costs declining, this implies that scale or size 
translates into a competitive advantage; it fosters consolidation. 
Thus two factors have traditionally been essential for the emergence and the lasting 
importance of a given financial center: (1) proximity or economics of agglomera-
tion, and (2) size or economics of scale and scope. The interplay of these factors 
and their importance are best illustrated for the case of stock exchanges as they used 
to be and how they operate today. Agglomeration was important because dealing on 
a trading floor simply required physical presence, which in turn suggested locating 
financial institutions that did exchange-related business close to the stock exchange, 
and vice-versa.  
The value of an exchange for its users depends on how liquid this market is, and li-
quidity depends on the number of traders and the volume of transactions they bring 
to the market, which gives rise to network externalities as well as economies of 
scale. Therefore the success of a stock exchange, which was, and still is, a core ele-
ment of any financial center, used to depend on how many finance professionals 
worked close to the exchange. Finally, the concentration of trading activity and 
traders in one location also suggested to have related activities such as clearing and 
settlement performed near by in order to limit transport and further costs of trans-
acting.  
Interestingly, this example also illustrates that traditional reasons for having a con-
centration of activities, institutions and persons in one place may no longer be valid. 
Being present at the trading floor is ceases to be necessary in the time of remote ac-
cess to trading systems such as XETRA. Moreover, it is now largely irrelevant 
where core computer facilities, providing the backbone of any electronic trading 
system, are located. Lastly, since documents are not literally transported any more 
for clearing and settlement purposes, the proximity between an exchange and the 
C&S facility is also no longer relevant. Some observers take this example as char-
acteristic, arguing that proximity, agglomeration and thus, more generally, location 
is not a relevant factor any more. O’Brien (1992) has characterized this phenome-
non by the term “the end of geography”. This trend seems to be particularly relevant -7- 
for the apparently footloose financial activities, and it raises the question of whether 
financial centers might retain any importance at all.  
All of this, evidently, provokes the question how far, building on its cluster charac-
teristics, the geographical reach of these highly localized services is. What is, in 
other words, the geography of finance or what produces distance and thus allows 
for a multitude of regional centers? How does distance in its various dimensions 
impact on financial location?  
III. Europe’s financial landscape in the process of redesigning 
Distance generating effects do not only result from transportations costs (Frankel 
2000, Leamer 2007). Distance – and thus a geography of markets – can be created 
by numerous sorts of barriers to communication and exchange such as language, 
culture, laws and legal institutions. In addition, even with similar laws and regula-
tions, different ways of implementation produce gaps to be bridged by intermediar-
ies: “Among many possible proofs that distance broadly understood is still impor-
tant, one of the simplest is the observed tendency toward geographical agglomera-
tions of industries … evidence both of costs to transportation and communication 
and of increasing returns to scale …” (Frankel 2000, p. 12-13). 
In European financial markets, we have, as already briefly mentioned, recently ex-
perienced two important distance-reducing institutional innovations – the introduc-
tion of a common currency and the re-configuration of European capital markets 
through the very encompassing process of the so-called Financial Services Action 
Plan, being itself a part of the Lisbon Process. Both institutional innovations imply 
that some defining characteristics of national markets, national currencies and na-
tional rules, have been substituted for by their European equivalents. With less need 
to customize financial flavors to special local preferences one might wonder what 
the reason of existence for local centers of finance in (continental) Europe is today.  
From the viewpoint of regional financial centers like Frankfurt, Paris or Amster-
dam, positioning concerns strategic decisions to be taken with regard to the arenas, -8- 
the products, and the clients to which those centers would like to cater (Saunders 
and Walter 1994, pp. 20-22). Ultimately, clients do not buy products but services. 
And users of a financial center are attracted by those special features of a financial 
hub differentiating it from its potential substitutes. This is very much akin to mo-
nopolistic competition which allows for variety, the location of a model in the 
product space (see for a very concise overview Frank 1994). In our case, it means 
that the number and attractiveness of financial places will be the result of a trade-off 
between economies and diseconomies of scale, reflecting the inherent tension be-
tween centripetal and centrifugal forces. And, as Frankel (1996) holds, given the 
near-indeterminacy of the location of trading, even relatively small costs can have a 
big effect on the possible consolidation of many small trading centers into a few 
large ones. But then again, one has to put the benefits and costs of consolidation 
against the benefits and costs of diversity. Market consolidation is, as a rule, the up-
shot of the growing capacity to serve local markets or clients cost effectively from a 
distance.  
Here we would like to go a bit more into details and add a comment on the current 
debate about the suitable organization of the securities transaction industry: Markets 
should allow for the cost-effective exchange of financial claims and thus contribute 
to an adequate determination of prices. The underlying demand-to-buy and offer-to-
sell financial claims generate an order flow, the handling of which depends on the 
procedures, rules etc. of the respective market. Trading comes at a cost, that is, it is 
impeded by commissions and fees which basically work like a transaction tax, 
thereby reducing the volume of trades. An optimal market allows for trading in a 
liquid and transparent environment, endogenously generating accurate prices at low 
costs. Moreover, the ability to buy and sell quickly into a market without moving 
the price, that is: liquidity, is an attribute of a good market. As a corollary, prices 
should not move much between trades adjacent in time – that is, good markets are 
characterized by price continuity which to some degree is synonymous with liquid-
ity. This requires some market depth or, to put it differently, numerous buyers or 
sellers being prepared to trade above and below current market prices. Finally, and, 
from a functional perspective most importantly, markets should be informationally 
efficient, thus reflect pertinent knowledge about the expected trajectory of the asset 
traded. -9- 
In a costless trading environment all these feats would be achieved without any 
trade-offs. Location would be of no concern whatsoever. In reality, however, differ-
ent market designs cater to the different attributes of tradable securities and the 
needs of different investors using these markets – be they retail or institutional in-
vestors. The places were trading and interaction takes place become relevant in 
view of participants’ preferences. Moreover, real world markets, even financial 
ones, are not about “countless faceless buyers meet[ing] countless sellers, and 
carry[ing] out exactly the same transaction” (Leamer 2007, p. 99). Rather, real 
world markets have always performed a number of important functions beyond pure 
match-making. The real raison d'être why numerous market places do exist – locally 
as well as virtually – is that exchanges cannot be reduced to price discovery only.   
A similar argument can be use to explain the co-existence of different business 
models for the stock exchange industry. Some exchanges offer only the core func-
tions of an exchange, namely contract-making and price determination, while others 
bundle these functions together with related activities including pre-settlement in-
formation-gathering, trade information processing, the distribution of trade-related 
information, clearing and settlement and, finally, custodial services. The vertical in-
tegration seems to be a logical corollary from the economies of scope (as well as 
scale) being inherent in such a bundle of intertwined functions.  
As is well known, this traditional argument for lumping together different ex-
change-related functions has recently come under substantial pressure. However, 
the position advanced in favor of unbundling has so far not been substantiated with 
genuine economic arguments but is, instead, merely supported by invoking man-
agement metaphors like “core competencies”. In any case, under a pro-market pre-
sumption the optimal design of the exchange industry would result from the inter-
play of demand and supply. Clients would be left to decide whether a “slicing-up” 
of the traditional value chain of the exchange industry is in their interest. Those 
who advocate political involvement as a way of determining what might be the 
more efficient business model should at least provide some arguments explaining 
why they know better than market participants. It seems to us that there are good 
reasons for having various trading venues available for clients, and this does sup-
port the coexistence of several financial centers offering different trading venues.  -10- 
As an upshot of the substantial reductions in the costs of overcoming distance (that 
is, in particular the progress in IC-technologies), financial centers seem to be threat-
ened by dé-localisation, becoming mere “virtual places”. The evidence, however, is 
unambiguous: Financial hubs are still very much real places, not at all dissolving 
into the immaterial. On the contrary, central functions have been concentrated; the 
anchoring in the real space has even been gaining in importance. The City of Lon-
don, Wall Street and the central business district of Frankfurt are highly visible cen-
ters in a very material meaning of the word, and to this very day are the parts of the 
respective cities where office rents are highest. How is this possible? The economist 
Thomas Gehrig (2000) has concisely characterized centripetal (economies of scale, 
information spillover, thick-market externalities) and centrifugal forces (market ac-
cess costs, localized information and informational complexity) for the case of fi-
nancial centers. Economic geographers have come up with a fairly similar list of 
explanatory factors. One among these is the advantage for employers as well as em-
ployees (with specialized demand or skills) of having a locally concentrated labor 
market, allowing for better matches. Another one is the availability of location-
specific elements of the infrastructure such as a high-quality and in particular robust 
data network (as in the inner city of Frankfurt) and a conveniently located major 
airport. The concentration of financial institutions in turn attracts specialized pro-
viders of finance-related services like those of law firms, IT providers, consultants 
and accounting firms.  
However, the most important factor responsible for the continuing existence of fi-
nancial centers is that the concentration of financial institutions and people offers 
ample opportunities for personal and business related contacts of both a formal and 
an informal nature. It is a most effective device to deal with “information sensitive” 
(Thomas Gehrig) or information-compact financial assets. This is also what Saskia 
Sassen (2002) refers to when she explains the advantages of “social connectivity”. 
Face-to face contact is important. Some types of information such as prices, interest 
rates and transaction data lend themselves to commoditization: that is to being digi-
tized and then communicated electronically. More complex information, however, 
is significantly less amenable to being processed automatically. Algorithms that 
would appropriately capture implicit knowledge are unavailable. Moreover, in 
many cases, information is confidential and ambiguous, that is, difficult to put a -11- 
judgment on. And it is about a two-way communicative: In order to determine 
whether the information is accepted and understood by a potential receiver it is nec-
essary for a sender to be able to assess the reaction of the person to whom it is ad-
dressed. It is important to observe the person who speaks as well as the one who is 
supposed to listen. Moreover, there must be the opportunity for a listener to send 
weak signals indicating that she or he would like to interrupt the speaker and to ask 
questions, and the transmitter of the information must be able to react to questions 
and even the appearance of doubts or unwillingness to be addressed. To be brief: In-
teractivity is of the essence. Finance is a field in which this kind of complex infor-
mation transfer is of special importance (see Lo 2003 for the case of the M&A 
business in Frankfurt).  
An additional argument supporting the importance of proximity and thus also of 
agglomeration concerns the role of trust. Evidently, trust is very important in finan-
cial dealings, and it is all the more important the more complex and context-
dependent the information is that is to be transmitted. Personal contacts are indis-
pensable for developing trusting relationships.  
Last but not least, knowledge that refers to innovations is often passed on in an in-
formal way and on the occasion of casual, not-planned-for contacts. Thus proximity 
and the possibility of face-to-face communication remain essential features of fi-
nancial hubs, and this is a major reason why financial centers such as Frankfurt are 
probably less threatened by the trend towards “virtualization” than some pundits 
currently claim.  
IV. Frankfurt’s place….  
However, we are still short of an answer to the question of what is, and can be, the 
position of Frankfurt in the European system of financial centers. History appears to 
make forcefully the case that within the domain of a common currency only one fi-
nancial place is likely to have a leading position. And Germany – as the Frankfurt 
history clearly shows – is a case in point. There may be a logic behind the emer--12- 
gence of just one financial center, and this logic is concisely captured in a simple, 
yet highly intuitive model of location choice under the influence of economies of 
agglomeration.  
The idea, being depicted in Figure 1 below, builds on the work of Brian Arthur 
(1994) on path-dependent developments. Assume that there are only two competing 
centers and that all that matters for banks’ location choices are the presumed bene-
fits of agglomeration. How many banks are already located in each of the two cen-
ters – the value on the horizontal axis – determines the agglomeration-based bene-
fits from also being in this place, being shown on the vertical axis. Quite naturally, 
any bank that plans to establish itself in one of the two centers or that considers to 
relocate would under these circumstances prefer the larger center promising a 
higher level of agglomeration benefits.  
Figure 1: Market share determining probablility of locational choice
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Any intersection of the straight line and the curve in Figure 1 shows an equilibrium 
position. At point X (which may be 50%, but does not have to be at this market 
share) the race is open since the realized and the desired market shares of the two 
competing locations are equal. But point X is an unstable equilibrium. Any starting 
point to the left or right to point X leads to a self-reinforcing process that estab-
lishes one unique center and reduces the importance of the competing location, 
largely as it has once occurred to Frankfurt as the winner and Hamburg as the loser. -13- 
Will a similar development relegate Frankfurt to the sidelines in the larger Euro-
pean context of a largely integrated European financial system?  
The Arthur model is, however, incapable of explaining likely future developments 
in Europe and thus to appropriately capture the situation of Frankfurt as a competi-
tor in the market for financial service locations. Its oversimplification consists in 
the assumption that the benefits of being close to other financial institutions are the 
only determinant of a bank’s location choice. Numerous locationally relevant fac-
tors are however not taken account of. One aspect that is not acknowledged in this 
model is the importance of being close to clients – the relevance of the economic 
hinterland – and the ease with which client-related information is accessed or ac-
quired.  
Seen from a global angle, there appears to be a hierarchy of financial centers. The 
leading global centers are New York, London and Tokyo (or possibly Hong Kong, 
Shanghai or Singapore). On a second level, we have the national financial centers 
such as Frankfurt, Paris, Milan and Amsterdam in Europe, and below these, we find 
various sub-centers or third-rank financial nodes in each country. The competitive 
situation of Frankfurt – the “structure of the industry” – could be evaluated in the 
context of the hierarchy of financial centers, as being portrayed in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Competition vs. Benchmarking  
New York London Tokyo
Milan Paris Frankfurt …
- München Hamburg …
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
Benchmarking
New York London Tokyo
Milan Paris Frankfurt …
- München Hamburg …
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
Benchmarking
 -14- 
From a German perspective, it may be nice to learn that Frankfurt has gained in im-
portance and quality as a financial center in a direct “beauty contest” with Paris dur-
ing the 1990s, as Sophia Harrschar-Ehrnborg has found out and described in a 
stimulating study from 2002; and from the same perspective it might be regrettable 
if an additional study performed in 2010 would come to the opposite conclusion. A 
direct comparison between Frankfurt and Paris may be useful for benchmarking 
purposes and can certainly provide useful advice to local policy makers on how 
they might try to buttress their financial place, but it is largely irrelevant under the 
aspect of competition. The reason is that there are probably very few banks that 
would ever consider to establish themselves in either Frankfurt or Paris or to relo-
cate major activities between these two financial centers. Competition that is rele-
vant for Frankfurt hardly occurs along the horizontal dimension. 
For second-level financial centers, the relevant question is how much of their finan-
cial activity they lose to London as the dominant hub in Europe or to München and 
Hamburg or, in the case of Paris, to Lyon and Bordeaux as lower-level financial 
nodes in their respective countries, and how much activity they can gain back from 
the financial centers above and below. The relevant form of competition for second 
and third rank centers occurs along the vertical dimension. Agglomeration effects 
tend to pull business to the higher level centers, that is, away from Frankfurt (and 
Paris) and transfers it to London and from München (Lyon) etc. towards Frankfurt 
(and Paris), while a growing importance of local contacts and local information 
would strengthen Frankfurt (and Paris) relative to London and München and Ham-
burg (or Lyon and Bordeaux) relative to their respective national financial centers. 
In his extensive study of the development of Frankfurt as a financial center, Mi-
chael Grote (2004) has shown that after having gained on a national level for a long 
time, Frankfurt has started to lose business to German sub-centers recently, exacer-
bating the long-lasting tendency to lose business to London. However, the relative 
weight of the centripetal and centrifugal forces can change comparatively quickly. 
This relative position depends in particular on the corporate strategies of large fi-
nancial services providers (banks, exchanges etc.) as well as on the respective cus-
tomer base. Thus it may be that the trends identified by Grote only a few years ago, 
may by now no longer be in force.  -15- 
Be that as it may, currently a large number of German banks are domiciled in 
Frankfurt, the Frankfurt stock exchange has emerged as the prime and most profit-
able stock exchange in Germany, and Frankfurt is home to two central banks, the 
European Central Bank and the Deutsche Bundesbank. In fact, the latter’s creation 
in 1957 was probably the decisive factor that contributed to the present role of this 
city in the national arena. And the ECB’s location is most probably supportive of 
Frankfurt’s role and place as well. Major accounting and law firms have built up 
strong capacities; the IT industry (hard- as well as software) located close to one of 
its major customers, and Frankfurt’s airport has developed into one of the major 
continental European transport hubs. Diseconomies of agglomeration are still rather 
low. Even more recently, the greater Frankfurt region has also become a productive 
center of academic research and teaching in finance-related fields.  
Frankfurt Paris London New York
Numbers of banks 280 200 340 ---
Number of foreign banks 150 160 260 ---
Bank assets 2.700 3.900 6.900 ---
Equity market capitalisation 1.200.000 2.800.000 2.900.000 11.700.000
Listed companies 760 1.210 3.256 2.280
Share trading volume 2.100.000 2.900.000 5.700.000 16.500.000
Daily turnover (equities) 8.200 11.400 22.800 65.800
Value of bond trading 218.300 295.600 2.504.200 300
Derivatives trading volume  1.270 240 1.000 ---
Volume of OTC derivatives 42 125 543 ---
FX trading 100 55 626 384
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
Table 1: Financial centers -- a few facts
 
Nonetheless, on an international scale, Frankfurt’s position is less significant. By 
any standards, London and New York are more important, and on the European 
Continent Paris has always been a formidable rival in the quest for the leading posi-
tion. Thus, from an international angle, Frankfurt is only one among several secon-
dary financial place in Europe. This is the driving motive behind political initiatives 
to support Frankfurt’s capacity in keeping up pace in order not to lose relative to in-
ternational financial centers, notably to London. The underlying concern – or pol-
icy-shaping motivation – is that advances in financial technology and information 
and communication tend to favor consolidation – and concurrently threaten to re-
duce the importance of all secondary financial centers.  -16- 
The data in Table 1 suggests that over the last quarter of a century Frankfurt has de-
veloped into a major financial hub in continental Europe. Almost 300 banks are 
domiciled in Frankfurt, and nearly two-thirds of those institutions (excluding repre-
sentative offices) are foreign owned. With a transaction volume of 2 billion US-$, 
Deutsche Börse is the sixth largest stock exchange in the world. 90 percent of all 
transactions in Germany go over the Frankfurt market. Particularly remarkable is 
the position of EUREX, the world’s largest market for forwards and futures.  
Bank employees business volume
1985 45.000 n.a.
1990 57.000 677,6 bn euro
1995 64.500 1.152,6 bn euro
2000 75.100 2.371,0 bn euro
2006 72.200 2.790,9 bn euro
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
Table 2: Banks in Frankfurt
 
About 72.000 employees find their occupation in the banking sector. To this one 
should add some 20.000 employees in the insurance and asset management business 
and, of course, the large number of accountants, lawyers, consultants and PR people 
which serve the financial industry.  
V. …and Frankfurt’s perspectives 
As we have argued, in contrast to many other industries, that of finance and banking 
apparently is not as strongly dependent on certain location factors. This would sug-
gest that the role of being an important financial center could change frequently. 
But this is not what has happened in the past. Financial hubs have retained their po-
sition for decades and even centuries. History matters, leading to path-dependence 
(Braudel 1979 or North 1990). This brings us to a rather circular point: The single 
most important factor determining whether a given city is a financial center and will 
be a financial center in the future is whether this city has been a financial center up 
to now and whether decision makers expect it to maintain this status. -17- 
Frankfurt’s franchise value mainly derived from the comparatively strong position 
of its banks as well as the robust demand emanating from its hinterland. Moreover, 
it developed a reputation for providing a cost-effective access to core inputs as well 
as a reliable and resilient infrastructure. In addition, Frankfurt-based institutions de-
veloped a strong expertise in a particular type of financial engineering, namely data 
processing, back office handling, as well as clearing and settlement.  
In addition, over the last decade, Frankfurt has been developing a financial-market 
oriented profile in academia as well (see Schmidt and Grote 2006 for details). In the 
House of Finance, which will be inaugurated next summer, the Land of Hesse has 
invested some 50 million Euros, to provide for an environment conducive to high-
quality research and education. The House of Finance will be the home to the fi-
nance-related departments of Frankfurt’s Goethe University and a number of affili-
ated research institutes, in particular the Center of Financial Studies, the Institute of 
Law and Finance and the e-finance lab. In addition to the university, the Goethe 
Business School and the MathFinance Lab strive for a high-quality education with 
direct relevance for the financial industry. Moreover, the greater Frankfurt area is 
home to the renowned University of Mannheim and to two highly regarded private 
Business Schools that also specialize in the financial education. In fact, these four 
institutions jointly constitute an undisputed center for financial research and educa-
tion in Germany, spanning the whole gamut of areas of importance in finance – 
from the back office, to financial engineering and to the customer interface. 
To be short, Frankfurt did not shy away from being ambitious. From this perspires, 
to some degree, a change of attitude. Germany, enjoying largely deregulated capital 
markets (no foreign exchange or interest regulations since the mid 1960s), has been 
rather slow to accept “innovative” financial products until the mid 1990s, chiefly, 
because in a low-inflation, low-volatility environment, there was no urgent need for 
devices to deal with financial market uncertainty. This was a major reason behind 
the Bundesbank’s traditional reluctance vis-à-vis new-fangled instruments. More-
over, a less innovative, however shock-resilient system facilitated money supply 
control. Financial sector stability was, after all, supportive of underwriting price sta-
bility as well. All in all, the attitude to things financial was therefore mainly conser-
vative. But this has changed since the mid-1990s, and to a large degree as a result of -18- 
the Europeanization of financial rule making. This holds true for the regulatory en-
vironment in general. 
Today, Frankfurt enjoys comparative advantages in particular with regard to its 
pool of specialized, highly competent human capital. Moreover, the technical infra-
structure, being a decisive input in financial markets, is reliable and cost-efficient. 
From all of this follows that the financial industry has developed into a major ele-
ment of the Frankfurt region’s economic base. Thus, in light of the self-reinforcing 
spill-over effects as well as the consequences of path dependence, Frankfurt appears 
to be rather well positioned in keeping-up its place in the competition between fi-
nancial places.  
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